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Despite calls for research comparing different forms of choice architecture interventions, little 
empirical work has directly made those comparisons. Here, I evaluate two strategies on whether 
they increase acceptance of recycled water on ethically relevant dimensions: libertarian 
paternalistic default nudges and educational decision aids. Experiment 1 (N = 81) showed that 
defaults increased shallow acceptance of recycled water (i.e., enrollment in a hypothetical 
recycled water program). Experiment 2 (N = 142) replicated the effect but also indicated that 
weak educational interventions (simple infographics) interacted with confidence, such that those 
who switched from the default had measurably higher confidence in their choice when given the 
infographic. Experiment 3 (N = 146) suggested that strong educational interventions (educational 
videos) increased shallow acceptance, increased knowledge of recycled water, and interacted 
with confidence in the same way observed in Experiment 2. Experiment 4 (N = 332) replicated 
the shallow acceptance, knowledge, and confidence results from previous experiments, and 
demonstrated that educational decision aids reliably increased deeper indicators of acceptance 
(e.g., behavioral intentions, affect, etc.). Ultimately, these results suggest that multiple practical 
and ethical factors (e.g., strength and mediums of educational interventions, depth of acceptance, 
potential ethical costs in terms of autonomy and decision confidence) need to be taken into 
account when deciding to implement these kinds of strategies in ethically defensible ways.  





Over the past decade, governments and organizations around the world have expressed 
increasing interest in applications and insights from the behavioral sciences. D. Halpern and 
Sanders (2016) have suggested that more than 20 countries—including the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Australia—have either implemented or expressed interest in implementing 
behavioral insights teams. These teams typically use approaches from psychology, behavioral 
economics, and other related fields to help people change behaviors. Likewise, the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has identified over 40 organizations and 
more than a hundred case studies where behavioral interventions are being used to improve 
outcomes across diverse domains (e.g., consumer choices, tax administration, public health; see 
OECD, 2017)). Overall, it has been estimated that these interventions easily represent hundreds 
of millions of dollars’ worth of monetary benefits (D. Halpern & Sanders, 2016). As more people 
continue to turn to behavioral insights, it is becoming increasingly important to identify key 
criteria that can help decision scientist and policymakers choose among the many forms of 
choice architecture (i.e., general methods of altering people’s choices; Münscher et al., 2016) 
that are currently available (Johnson et al., 2012).  
Among the many potential criteria for deciding among choice architecture interventions 
(e.g., effectiveness at changing behavior, monetary costs required to implement the intervention), 
one important set of criteria is whether interventions are consistent with commonly held ethical 
standards (e.g., American Psychological Association, 2002). While the ethical implications of 
different forms of choice architecture have been the subject of much theoretical debate (e.g., 
Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, 2012; Bovens, 2009; Hausman & Welch, 2010; Selinger & 
Whyte, 2011; Sunstein, 2015a, 2015b), to my knowledge, no empirical work has been conducted 
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to (a) identify ethical relevant criteria for evaluation, and (b) examine whether interventions 
differ along those criteria. Here, my focus is on the set of criteria surrounding respect for 
informed deliberation. Informed deliberation is often thought to be important component of 
autonomy—a factor that almost all ethical codes suggest there is a prima facie duty to protect 
(and perhaps promote). As such, here I seek to empirically compare two popular kinds of choice 
architecture interventions—(1) educational decision aids seeking to increase domain specific 
knowledge and (2) libertarian paternalistic default nudges—with respect to how much they 
protect (and perhaps promote) informed deliberation.  
I contextualize the comparisons in the domain of recycled water acceptance. Recycled 
water represents one partial solution to increasingly concerning world-wide water scarcity issues. 
It has been estimated that at least one-third of the world’s population currently lives in water-
stressed countries (Elimelech, 2006) and nearly 80% of people live in areas where threats to 
human water security exceed the 75th percentile (Vörösmarty et al., 2010). As such, interest in 
non-conventional ways to increase potable water capacity has grown globally (Tortajada & Ong, 
2016). One promising and prominent non-conventional source of water involves the treatment 
and reuse of municipal wastewater, commonly referred to as recycled water, reclaimed water, or 
reuse water (United States Environmental Protection Agency et al., 2012). However, despite 
research and implementations demonstrating that recycled water can be safely used for potable, 
drinking purposes (or is at least as safe as typical tap water; e.g., Khan & Roser, 2007), public 
acceptance represents a significant barrier to the actual implementation of potable water reuse 
methods. Thus there has been interest from researchers and policy makers in developing 
programs to help overcome public distaste for recycled water (Dishman et al., 1989). 
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Overall, in a series four experiments, I provide evidence that using libertarian 
paternalistic defaults can sometimes be effective at increasing shallow indicators of recycled 
water acceptance (e.g., choosing to enroll in a hypothetical recycled water program). I also show 
that some educational interventions can increase acceptance of recycled water while at the same 
time contributing to deeper indicators of acceptance, including increasing other desirable 
outcomes (e.g., increased knowledge, confidence, and satisfaction) and decreasing undesirable 
outcomes (e.g., intentions to protest and move). These results ultimately highlight some 
important benefits and practical costs associated with each strategy. They also show that 
libertarian paternalistic defaults are often less able to support informed deliberation than 
educational interventions, suggesting that libertarian paternalistic defaults may risk violating 
moral rules concerning autonomy. Ultimately, these studies suggest that careful consideration 
and comparisons among choice architectures are required for policy implementation to be 
ethically and practically justified.  
Recycled Water Acceptance and Psychology 
Both direct and indirect potable water recycling methods1 have been implemented and 
proven effective at providing safe, reliable drinking water (i.e., as safe as traditional tap water) in 
many locations such as Singapore, Namibia, and parts of the United States (Lee & Tan, 2016; 
Sanchez-Flores et al., 2016; van Rensburg, 2016). Notably, potable recycled water is, in general, 
less energy-intensive than some other methods of increasing water capacity (e.g., de-salination), 
 
1 Direct potable water recycling occurs when advanced treated wastewater goes straight to a 
conventional water treatment plant to be prepared for distribution. Indirect potable recycling 
happens when treated wastewater is used to augment an existing water source (e.g., a lake, 
reservoir, or aquifer). The existing water source acts as an environmental buffer before the water 
is eventually reintroduced into the conventional treatment plant (United States Environmental 
Protection Agency et al., 2012). 
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largely resistant to environmental changes (e.g., drought), and reduces waste discharged back 
into the environment (Fielding et al., 2019). Despite these advantages, however, public 
acceptance of recycled water in many cases remains low, especially for potable purposes such as 
cooking and drinking (see Dolničar & Saunders, 2006). Furthermore, the low public acceptance 
of recycled water represents a significant barrier to the implementation of water recycling 
methods, as public opposition has, in some cases, halted proposed water recycling projects (e.g., 
San Diego; Hurlimann & Dolnicar, 2010; Po, Kaercher, & Nancarrow, 2003; Uhlmann & Head, 
2011).  
Many decades of research into potable recycled water suggest that public acceptance is 
often a function of the interplay of many psychological factors such as disgust, perception of 
health risks and benefits, perceived need for alternative water supplies, trust in authority, and 
relevant knowledge (see Fielding et al., 2019; Smith et al., 2018 for reviews). Given the 
importance of these kinds of psychological factors, approaches from psychology and behavioral 
economics may be able to take advantage of some of these psychological factors to help 
encourage reuse water acceptance. Consistent with the notion that interfaces and affordances can 
(and should) be scientifically designed to facilitate and enhance human and system performance 
(Wickens et al., 2015), two prominent forms choice architecture that could take advantage of 
some of these psychological factors can be broadly categorized into methods that seek to inform 
decision makers to make them more knowledgeable or skilled and methods that seek to persuade 
individuals using non-rational means (see Feltz & Cokely, 2018; Grüne-Yanoff & Hertwig, 





Educational Decision Aids 
One common type of choice architecture which may be especially relevant to acceptance 
of science and scientific innovations like recycled water treatment involves providing enough 
relevant information about the topic so that people can make an informed decision for 
themselves. While many social, cultural, economic, and political factors are influential in 
forming attitudes toward science (Hayes & Tariq, 2000; Priest, 2001), domain specific 
knowledge (i.e., understanding of relevant facts about a given topic) is often thought to be 
integral to the public’s acceptance of scientific innovations, and public doubt about these 
innovations are often thought to be largely attributable to misunderstanding or ignorance about 
key scientific facts (see Sturgis & Allum, 2004). Consistent with this notion, knowledge has 
often been found to have modest, positive correlations with attitudes towards often polarizing 
scientific issues (Allum et al., 2008; Nisbet, 2005; Nisbet & Goidel, 2007). Research also 
suggests that transparent decision aids, simple interventions, and training programs are often able 
to convey relevant facts and sometimes dramatically improve decision making (i.e., increase 
decisions that are in line with one’s own best interest or values) among a wide variety of people 
(Cokely et al., 2018; Garcia-Retamero & Cokely, 2013, 2017; see also Bruine de Bruin & 
Bostrom, 2013; Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff, 2007; Fischhoff, Brewer, & Downs, 2011; 
Petrova, van der Pligt, & Garcia-Retamero, 2014; D. Petrova, Garcia-Retamero, & Cokely, 2015; 
Trevena et al., 2013). 
To explain the relationship between educational decision aids, knowledge, and attitudes 
toward scientific issues like recycled water acceptance, one might look to Cokely et al.'s (2018) 
framework for skilled decision making. In their paper, Cokely et al (2018) assert that transparent 
decision aids are specifically designed to promote an increasingly representative understanding 
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(understanding that is sufficiently rich and nuanced that additional random information is 
unlikely to bias inferences made from that knowledge). Part of the skilled decision framework 
posits that transparent decision aids and general cognitive abilities (e.g., numeracy) support good 
decision making by directly influencing deliberation, confidence calibration, and knowledge, 
which in turn affects the precision and calibration of affective reactions (see Figure 1). That is, at 
least in part, transparent educational decision aids are thought to affect good decisions by 
providing individuals with information to come to a deeper understanding of how a decision will 
factor into their own lives, what they value, and how they feel. 
  For these reasons, providing people with educational decision aids containing relevant 
information about recycled water may help them come to a more representative understanding of 
the decision, which may in turn may promote recycled water acceptance. For example because 
most people’s objective knowledge of recycled water is low (Glick et al., 2019), a high-quality 
educational decision aid (i.e., one that provides information that a wide variety of people can 
understand) might prompt deliberation and facilitate increased understanding of some of the 
important cognitive (i.e., mental states capable of being true or false) determinants of acceptance 
(e.g., need for alternative water supplies, potential risks and benefits). In turn, that understanding 
may lead to more appropriate affective reactions (e.g., decreased disgust and worry about 
potential risks) and lead to acceptance decisions that are more consistent with expert consensus 
concerning the safety and need for recycled water.  
The current literature contains a few experiments where the effects of information-based 
decision aids on reuse water decisions were examined (Dolnicar et al., 2010; Fielding & Roiko, 
2014; Price et al., 2015; Roseth, 2008; Simpson & Stratton, 2011). Generally, consistent with the 
framework for skilled decision theory, these studies have found educational aids to be effective 
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in encouraging water reuse acceptance; however, the overall magnitude of their effects have 
tended to be small (Dolnicar et al., 2010; Price et al., 2015; Roseth, 2008). One potential 
explanation for the overall small effects is that methods of informing have varied widely across 
these studies, with the decision aids ranging anywhere from brief statements about the 
wastewater recycling process (Dolnicar et al., 2010) to 47-page online booklet containing 
detailed recycled water information (Simpson & Stratton, 2011). Importantly, none of the studies 
have explored potential proximal cognitive factors (e.g., increase in knowledge; reduction in 
disgust reactions) that could be changed by educational interventions. 
Libertarian Paternalistic Default Nudges  
While education could increase recycled water acceptance, an alternative could involve 
intentionally exploiting heuristics (i.e., mental shortcuts) or biases (i.e., decision making 
tendencies; see Cokely et al., 2018) to persuade people to accept recycled water (see Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974). Approaches that intentionally take advantage of heuristics or biases often fall 
in the general category of a popular behavioral intervention strategy known as nudging. Nudge 
strategies construct decision making environments that primarily target automatic processing 
(i.e., thinking processes that are quick and reflexive; see Evans, 2008; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) 
to steer decision makers toward a specific choice without specifically forbidding any choices, 
thus technically respecting an individual’s right to choose differently (Sunstein, 2014).  
Within the broader category of nudges, some forms of nudges might be described as 
libertarian paternalistic (see Figure 2). Of note, there are several conceptions of what constitutes 
a libertarian paternalistic intervention (see Hausman & Welch, 2010; Sunstein, 2014; Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2003). For example, Thaler and Sunstein (2008) define libertarian paternalism as a 
policy that influences choice “in a way that will make choosers better off, as judged by 
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themselves” (p. 5) while still preserving the individual’s right to choose. On this view, the 
‘libertarian’ aspect of Libertarian Paternalism is reflected in leaving open (perhaps formally) 
choice options where one could choose something other than the encouraged choice, while the 
‘paternalistic’ aspect is reflected in encouraging the specific choice that will likely benefit the 
decision maker. However, I follow the more developed notion of ‘paternalism’ offered by Gert 
and Culver (1979): 
A is acting paternalistically toward S if and only if A’s behavior (correctly) indicates that 
A believes that (1) his action is for S’s good; (2) he is qualified to act on S’s behalf; (3) 
his action involves violating a moral rule (or will require him to do so) with regard to S 
[emphasis added]; (4) S’s good justifies him in acting on S’s behalf independently of S’s 
past, present, or immediately forthcoming (free, informed) consent; and (5) S believes 
(perhaps falsely) that he (S) generally knows what is for his own good. (p. 199) 
In accordance with this definition, for the purposes of this paper, I adopt a view similar to 
Hausman and Welch (2010), where a libertarian paternalistic intervention is one that attempts to 
predictably influence behavior while still leaving open the ability to choose differently (i.e., 
libertarian), but also involves the violation of some moral rule (i.e., paternalistic).  
 Often, autonomy (i.e., the actual condition of agents governing themselves; Mele, 2001) 
is thought to be violated with libertarian paternalistic policies (although autonomy is not the only 
potential violation). Infringing on individuals’ autonomy is widely regarded as a moral violation 
(e.g., respecting autonomy is reflected in numerous professional ethics codes, including the 
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American Psychological Associations’). On Mele’s (2001) view of autonomy, a (self-
controlled2) person has acted autonomously if: 
1. The agent has no compelled motivational states, nor any coercively produced 
motivational states. 
2. The agent's beliefs are conducive to informed deliberation about all matters that 
concern him. 
3. The agent is a reliable deliberator. (p. 187) 
Adopting this view, the implication is that one way for an individual to be autonomous is to be 
free from coercion, to have access to whatever correct information is required to deliberate 
accurately, and to possess the executive skills and habits necessary to meaningfully incorporate 
relevant factors into their overall decision. Because not all libertarian paternalistic policies 
inform people (Sunstein, 2015a), and thus often do not engage rational agency (i.e., a set of 
capacities—competence and being informed—that allow one to integrate available information, 
values, and prior beliefs to make a decision; Feltz & Cokely, 2021) while influencing choices, 
libertarian paternalistic interventions are often thought to violate the second condition (for the 
purposes of this thesis, I leave it open whether libertarian paternalistic interventions also do not 
satisfy conditions 1 and 3). Notably, however, to my knowledge, no previous work has ever 
attempted to empirically evaluate this assumption. 
 One particularly powerful and popular application of Libertarian Paternalistic strategies is 
the use of default rules (often referred to as “default nudges,” e.g., Blumenthal-Barby & 
 
2 The ‘self-controlled’ qualification is necessary on Mele’s account to rule out some cases of 
weakness of will. This is a technical point and does not substantially influence the analyses 
offered here.  
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Burroughs, 2012; Ghesla et al., 2019; Venema et al., 2018), which holds that as a result of 
factors such as heuristics, biases, and inertia (the tendency to stay with an option because it is 
easier to take no action than it is to perform some action to actively switch options; see Madrian 
& Shea, 2001; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) people often stick with default options (Johnson & 
Goldstein, 2013). That is, when individuals have the choice to stay with the default option, they 
often tend to stay with the default, even though they are perfectly free to choose something other 
than the default option. As such, by carefully designing the default option, individuals and 
organizations can often steer decision makers towards a desired choice while still technically 
leaving open the option to choose differently (see Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Under these 
theoretical assumptions, default nudging often qualifies as libertarian paternalistic because it 
often fails to inform participants and thus does not engage rational agency (see Figure 3). 
Defaults do not typically influence choice by increasing cognitive processes typical of rational 
agency like knowledge, beliefs, deliberation, or confidence. However, educational decision aids 
typically do not qualify as libertarian paternalistic because they often use information to 
contribute to representative understanding (e.g., increasing what one knows about a problem) 
and thus critically engage rational agency.  
To illustrate libertarian paternalistic default nudges with a real-world example, Halpern et 
al. (2013) conducted a field experiment in which they used default rules to influence seriously ill 
patients’ choice between comfort-oriented end-of-life care or life-extending care. Some of the ill 
patients received a form where the box to select either the comfort-care option or the life-
extending option was already checked with an ‘X’. In total, 77% of patients with the pre-selected 
comfort option chose the comfort option, while only 43% of patients with the pre-selected life-
extending option switched and chose the comfort care, suggesting that the default influenced 
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choice. However, because no information concerning the care options was provided to 
participants, it is not likely that those individuals understood the problem better in any 
meaningful way. As such, moral rules concerning autonomy may have been violated by pre-
selecting defaults for those patients (or at least autonomy was not promoted). 
 The effect of defaults has been observed across many domains, including contributing to 
retirement plans, consenting to be organ donors, end of life health and financial decisions, and 
various consumer (i.e., buying a product or service) domains (Feltz, 2015, 2016; Jachimowicz et 
al., 2019; Johnson & Goldstein, 2003; Madrian & Shea, 2001). To my knowledge, no studies 
have attempted to examine the viability of libertarian paternalistic default nudges in the context 
of recycled water acceptance.  Given the pervasiveness of default nudges, these nudges are likely 
to be useful in encouraging acceptance of recycled water. Thus, by carefully setting default 
options, one could theoretically take advantage of heuristic-based decision processes and 
essentially circumvent other relevant psychological barriers to acceptance of recycled potable 
water.  
Contrasting Informing and Libertarian Paternalistic Default Nudging 
 Despite calls for research better comparing default nudges to other choice architecture 
interventions (Jachimowicz et al., 2019) and theoretical frameworks that have been proposed to 
help policymakers decide between libertarian paternalistic and non-libertarian paternalistic 
intervention strategies (e.g., Hertwig, 2017), little empirical work has been done to directly 
compare educational interventions to libertarian paternalistic default nudges on ethically relevant 
dimensions (e.g., autonomy). Arguments concerning potential violations of moral rules are often 
minimized or even dismissed solely on the grounds that libertarian paternalistic interventions 
preserve the individual’s freedom to choose. For example, concerning autonomy, Sunstein 
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(2015a) states, “When sensible nudges are in place, human agency is retained (because freedom 
of choice is not compromised)” (p. 209) and further goes on to say that “desirable nudges should 
undermine neither autonomy nor welfare. On the contrary, they can promote both values; indeed, 
they might be indispensable for them” (p. 210). One of the only empirical studies that has been 
conducted directly comparing different choice architecture methods was conducted by Benartzi 
et al. (2017). Using publicly instituted programs and publicly available outcomes, they 
conducted dollar-based cost-benefit analyses comparing libertarian paternalistic nudges like the 
default to traditional interventions like educational campaigns and monetary incentive programs. 
They found that adjusting for costs, interventions like default nudges are often comparatively 
more impactful per-dollar spent than traditional tools like incentive programs. However, actual 
experimental comparisons of defaults and educational interventions (e.g., Prusaczyk et al., 2021) 
are rare.  
This lack of empirical work—especially in investigating claims that libertarian 
paternalistic default nudges might violate moral rules—is concerning. If libertarian paternalistic 
default nudging does violate a moral rule, there are potential ethical costs associated with 
selecting this type of intervention compared to using educational decision aids that policymakers 
might need to consider. However, the fact that a policy violates a moral rule does not entail that 
it is impermissible to implement that policy. There could be other goods that are obtained that 
are sufficient to outweigh the costs associated with the moral rule. These considerations are in 
line with the justification for paternalistic policies in general. Accordingly, even if a moral rule is 
violated, one important task is to identify relevant criteria to directly compare libertarian 
paternalistic default nudges to educational decision aids in order to determine in what 
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circumstances the violation of the moral rule might be justified (e.g., when do goods outweigh 
costs, which costs and benefits, and by how much). 
 As such the primary goal of this paper is to experimentally compare the effectiveness of 
libertarian paternalistic default nudges and educational interventions at encouraging recycled 
water acceptance along ethically relevant dimensions. I do this using several criteria. The first is 
a shallow indicator of recycled water acceptance, which I operationalize as a binary choice to 
enroll in a hypothetical program which would deliver recycled water to residential taps. I refer to 
this binary enrollment choice as a shallow indicator of acceptance because actions might not 
always be congruent with what people would take to reflect their deeply held values that 
constitutes who they are (i.e., the “deep” self). For example, Wolf (2013) argues that victims of 
brainwashing may not be responsible for their actions because external forces have essentially 
severed the connection between their actions and their deeper self. Similarly, Hausman & Welch 
(2010) argue that when choice architectures take advantage of psychological foibles (e.g., 
heuristics and biases) to nudge decisions, actions can often reflect the tactics of the choice 
architect rather than the will of the decision maker. Thus, a simple acceptance choice may not 
always be a reliable indicator of true attitudinal or behavioral change that is essential for one to 
be self-governed. Specifically, I hypothesize:   
𝐻1: Defaulting individuals into a hypothetical recycled water program will increase 
shallow acceptance of recycled water (i.e., enrollment in the program) compared to being 
defaulted out of the program. 
𝐻2: Relevant educational interventions will increase shallow recycled water acceptance 
compared to not receiving a relevant educational intervention. 
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H3: Relevant educational interventions will be more effective at increasing shallow 
recycled water acceptance than defaulting individuals into the program. 
 Second, this paper also adds to previous literature by empirically evaluating claims 
concerning potential violations of autonomy as a criterion of interest when comparing libertarian 
paternalistic default nudges to educational interventions. While many have made the case that 
libertarian paternalistic policies might infringe upon individuals’ autonomy and thus can involve 
important ethical costs (e.g., Bovens, 2009; Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Hausman & Welch, 
2010; Wilkinson, 2013), the only empirical work that has been conducted seemingly explores 
only subjective perceptions of autonomy (i.e., the extent to which individuals (would) feel certain 
policies limit their freedom of choice and autonomy; see Felsen et al., 2013; Hagman et al., 
2015; Jung & Mellers, 2016; Yan & Yates, 2019). In line with Mele's (2001) framework 
described previously suggesting three sufficient conditions for autonomy (i.e., freedom from 
coercion, access to information needed to deliberate accurately, and possession of executive 
skills needed to deliberate reliably), in this paper I seek to objectively compare the extent to 
which libertarian paternalistic default nudges and educational interventions respect one of these 
conditions—access to informed deliberation. Specifically, using objective knowledge of recycled 
water as an indicator, I hypothesize: 
𝐻4: Only relevant educational interventions will reliably increase objective knowledge of 
recycled water. 
H5: Knowledge will causally mediate the relationship between an effective educational 
intervention and acceptance of recycled water. 
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 Relatedly, I compared the effects of libertarian paternalistic default nudges and 
educational interventions on decision confidence levels. Decision confidence (i.e., subjective 
evaluations of the extent to which individuals felt they made the “correct” recycled water 
decision) was included as a criterion of interest based on prior research suggesting that 
appropriate levels of confidence are often indicative of higher quality normative decisions 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Gronlund et al., 2015; Ybarra et al., 2018), while overconfidence may 
lead to poorer quality decisions (Bruine de Bruin et al., 2007; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & 
West, 2000). Based on this link between confidence calibration and decision quality, as well as 
previous research linking knowledge to decision quality (see Cokely et al., 2018) I hypothesize: 
𝐻6: Individuals will be more confident in educationally informed choices than default-
influenced choice. 
Finally, this paper adds to previous literature by also exploring deeper indicators of 
acceptance as a criterion for evaluation. Hertwig (2017) has suggested that default rules can lead 
to errors (e.g., sometimes individuals fail to opt out of an organ donation default, even when they 
do not want to be organ donors). Accordingly, a binary choice to enroll in a recycled water 
program reflect may not fully reflect the will of the decision maker (Hausman & Welch, 2010). 
Likewise, binary enrollment choice gives very little information about the strength of one’s 
acceptance (i.e., Person A could be strongly opposed to recycled water, while Person B could be 
only slightly opposed to recycled water, but a single binary choice would likely not differentiate 
between these two people). Understanding the strength of one’s acceptance could be valuable 
practically, as a policymaker would likely want to take this factor into account before investing 
time and resources into potential interventions.  
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Accordingly, consistent with some of the relevant factors predicted in Cokely et al.’s 
(2018) skilled decision framework, I also compare the extent to which libertarian paternalistic 
defaulting and informing promote behaviors, attitudes, intentions, and emotions that would be 
indicative of deeper acceptance. Consistent with the idea that external forces can cause actions to 
be incongruent with deeper held desires (Wolf, 2013), for the purposes of this paper, deep 
acceptance refers to things like beliefs, desires, and intentions that better reflect one’s true will 
and values.  Specifically, I was interested in exploring the interventions’ effects on acceptance 
strength, intentions related to recycled water implementation (e.g., protesting/moving), actual 
participation in behaviors related to acceptance (e.g., signing up for information), how much 
individuals felt they would be satisfied with a policymaker who decided to implement recycled 
water, worry about long-term health, and recommendations they would give to others if recycled 
water were to be implemented in their community. Each of these criteria should provide a more 
in-depth indication of acceptance than simply staying opted into a recycled water program. 
Broadly, I hypothesize that: 
𝐻7: Educational interventions will result in increased levels of deeper acceptance than 
libertarian paternalistic default interventions. 
I tested these hypotheses in a series of four experiments. Experiment 1 tested the 
effectiveness of the libertarian paternalistic default nudge alone and demonstrated that defaults 
can influence shallow acceptance choices about recycled water. Experiment 2 tested and 
compared the effects of defaults and an educational intervention containing simple, brief 
information about recycled potable water (i.e., an infographic) on shallow acceptance, 
knowledge, and decision confidence, finding that libertarian paternalistic defaults again 
influenced shallow acceptance choice while the simple infographic did not influence choice or 
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knowledge. There was also an interaction found for confidence, where those who stayed with 
defaults had similar confidence in their choice regardless of the information they were given, 
while those who switched from their default were significantly less confident when they did not 
receive relevant information, compared to those who did receive the relevant information. 
Experiment 3 tested and compared the effects of libertarian paternalistic defaults and a longer, 
more complex educational intervention (i.e., a short educational video) on shallow acceptance, 
knowledge, and decision confidence, finding that the educational video affected shallow 
acceptance choice and knowledge, while the default did not. Confidence results from the 
previous experiment were also replicated. Finally, Experiment 4 used a custom-made educational 
video to compare the effects of libertarian paternalistic defaults and an educational intervention 
on both shallow and deep forms of acceptance, as well as knowledge and confidence. 
Experiment 4 suggested that both the new educational video and the defaults influenced shallow 
acceptance choice, but only the educational video affected knowledge and the deeper indicators 
of acceptance.  
Experiment 1 
 Because no previous studies have examined the effects of defaults on recycled water 
acceptance choices, Experiment 1 was designed to see if libertarian paternalistic default nudges 








 Participants. Participants for this study were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk3 (MTurk). Participants responded to an online survey in exchange for $0.50 USD4. 
Responses were collected from 106 participants, but a total of 25 participants were excluded for 
answering a multiple-choice attention check question incorrectly: 
The scenario I just responded to involved which of the following? (Correct answer = 
water bill  
 Of the remaining 81 participants, 54% were female (N = 44). Mean age was 37.85 (SD = 12.10), 
with a range of 21-67. A post-hoc power analysis indicated that the current study could detect a 
medium sized effect (power = .8, alpha = .05, V = 0.31). 
 Procedure. Participants were asked to imagine they were paying their water bill and 
were presented with the following hypothetical prompt:  
Our city is implementing a program to begin using high quality reclaimed (i.e., recycled) 
water for various purposes, including use in residential taps. Our records indicate that you 
may be affected by this change. You (are/are not) currently enrolled in this program, but 
you have the option to (enroll/unenroll). Please indicate your enrollment preference 
below. 
 
3 Amazon’s Mechanical Turk can be a reliable, quality source of experimental data (M. 
Buhrmester et al., 2011; M. D. Buhrmester et al., 2018; Crump et al., 2013; Mason & Suri, 2012; 
Paolacci et al., 2010; Rouse, 2015). 
4 Procedures and materials for all experiments reported in this paper were approved by the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the University of Oklahoma. 
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One group (N = 40) was randomly assigned to the default-out condition, while the other group (N 
= 41) was assigned to the default-in condition. Participants in the default-out condition were 
informed that they were not automatically enrolled in this program but would be given the option 
to enroll if they desired. Participants in the default-in condition were informed that they were 
automatically enrolled in the program but would be given the option to unenroll. Participants 
were then asked to indicate whether they would prefer to stay with their respective default option 
(“I would like to remain enrolled/unenrolled”) or switch to the alternate option (“I would like to 
switch and enroll/unenroll”). Participants also provided basic demographic information.  
Results and Discussion 
In total, 26 out of 41 (63%) participants in the default-in condition chose to enroll in the 
program while only 13 out of 40 (33%) participants in the default-out condition chose to enroll in 
the program, 𝜒2(1) = 7.75, p = .005, V = .31 (90% CI [0.13, 0.49]). These data were consistent 
with Hypothesis 1—defaulting people into the reuse program was associated with greater 
acceptance of the program compared to defaulting people out of the program.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 sought to replicate the results of Experiment 1 and to compare the 
effectiveness of libertarian paternalistic default nudges versus informing people of some facts 
about recycled water.  
Method 
 Participants. Participants for this experiment were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk, and they responded to an online survey in exchange for $0.50 USD. Responses were 
collected from 172 individuals, but a total of 30 participants were excluded for answering 
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attention check questions incorrectly and displaying additional signs of inattention (e.g., 
excessive attempts to advance timed survey pages before the option was available). Of the 
remaining 142 participants, 65% were female (N = 92). Mean age was 38.65 (SD = 13.55), with 
a range of 19-73 (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics from Experiment 2). A post-hoc power 
analysis indicated that the current study could reliably detect a small sized effect (power = .8, 
alpha = .05 V = 0.23).  
 Procedure. Participants in this experiment were first assigned to either a relevant 
information or irrelevant information condition. Those in the relevant information condition 
were presented with a simple infographic briefly explaining the benefits and reasons for using 
recycled drinking water (see Figure 4). Participants in the irrelevant information condition were 
presented with a similar infographic explaining how the internet works (see Figure 5). All 
participants were then asked a set of five true or false objective knowledge questions about 
recycled water created in conjunction with water reuse engineers: 
1. Highly treated reuse water can be safe to drink. (T) 
2. Direct potable water reuse refers to advanced treatment of wastewater that is then sent 
to water treatment plants and then to the drinking water supply. (T)  
3. Cities around the world are using reuse water as a source for drinking water. (T) 
4. Highly treated reuse water used for drinking water is resilient to regional droughts. 
(T) 
5. Advanced treatment of reuse water can be less expensive than desalinating water for 
drinking water. (T)  
Correct responses to these questions were coded as 1, while other responses were coded as 0. 
These were then summed to obtain an objective knowledge score.  
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Next, participants were randomly assigned and responded to one of the default scenarios 
from Experiment 1. After responding to their scenario, participants were asked three questions to 
gauge their level of confidence in their choice: 
1. I feel confident in my decision.  
2. I feel comfortable with my decision.  
3. I feel set in my decision.   
These three questions were adapted from Scherer et al. (2015) and were measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree).  
Then, participants completed the Revised Disgust Scale (DS-R; Haidt, McCauley, & 
Rozin, 1994, modified by Olatunji et al., 2007), a scale that measures individual sensitivity to 
potentially disgusting objects and scenarios. Past research suggests that disgust sensitivity is 
negatively associated with acceptance of recycled water (Alhumoud et al., 2003; Bruvold & 
Ward, 1972; Dishman et al., 1989; Dolnicar & Schäfer, 2009; Madany et al., 1992; Menegaki et 
al., 2007; Miller & Buys, 2008; Nancarrow et al., 2009; Po et al., 2005; Schmidt, 2008), thus I 
included the disgust measure in the study primarily to check that indicators of recycled water 
acceptance were functioning properly (i.e., if enrolling in the hypothetical water program is a 
valid indicator of recycled water acceptance, I would expect it to be significantly correlated with 
disgust sensitivity)5.  
 
5 Disgust was significantly correlated with enrollment choice in each of the remaining 
experiments (see Tables 2 and 5), such that higher disgust was consistently associated with lower 
enrollment in the recycled water program. This provided sufficient evidence to proceed with 
analyses in each case. I also checked to ensure there was not an unequal distribution of 
participants with high disgust across levels of the independent variables (i.e., relevant vs 
irrelevant info and default-in vs. default-out) and found no evidence of unequal distributions in 
any of the experiments, thus reducing the concern disgust may have acted as a confound.    
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Participants next completed the 7-item version of the Berlin Numeracy Test (BNT; 
Cokely, Galesic, Schulz, Ghazal, & Garcia-Retamero, 2012; Schwartz, Woloshin, Black, & 
Welch, 1997). The BNT measures statistical numeracy, or the ability to understand and apply 
basic probabilistic information, which has been shown to predict better understanding and 
choices across many domains (Cokely et al., 2012; Garcia-Retamero et al., 2019; Peters, 2012) 6. 
Finally, participants provided basic demographic information. 
Results and Discussion 
Consistent with my first hypothesis and results from the previous experiment, the default 
manipulation was statistically significant, 𝜒2(1) = 4.81, p = .03, V = .18 (90% CI [0.04, 0.32]). 
Specifically, 42 of 73 (58%) participants in the default-in condition chose to enroll, while only 
27 of 69 (39%) participants in the default-out condition chose to enroll in the hypothetical water 
reuse program. 
Contrary to my second and third hypotheses, receiving relevant information was not 
associated with measurably higher enrollment in the program, 𝜒2(1) = 0.33, p = .57, V = 0.05 
(90% CI [0, 0.18]). However, contrary to Hypothesis 4, there was also no significant difference 
between information groups in the amount of objective knowledge questions participants 
correctly answered (relevant: M = 3.39, SD = 1.27; irrelevant: M = 3.29, SD = 1.39; t(140) = .42, 
p = .68, d = .08 (90% CI [-0.20, 0.35])), meaning the educational intervention might not have 
been strong, informative, or interesting enough to prompt deliberation and learning. There was 
 
6 Numeracy was not significantly related to any variables of interest in Experiments 2 and 3 (see 
Table 2 for correlations), thus it was not included in any analyses for those studies. 
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also no significant difference in objective knowledge between those in the default-out and 
default-in conditions (t(140) = .72, p = .47, d = .12 (90% CI [-.16, .40])). 
An additional goal of this experiment was to examine characteristics of confidence in 
light of the information conditions. Responses to the three confidence questions had good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .89), so confidence scores were averaged into a 
composite score.  Composite confidence ratings were significantly correlated with scores on the 
objective knowledge test (r = .26, p < .01; see Table 1 for correlations among variables in 
Experiment 2). To illustrate this difference, I split participants by median knowledge score (high 
scores > 3). High knowledge participants (N = 67) were more confident in their choice (M = 
2.93, SD = 0.87) than low knowledge participants (M = 2.48, SD = 0.80; t(140) = 3.17, p < .01, d 
= .54 (90% CI [0.26, .82])), suggesting that at least some participants were adequately calibrated 
in their confidence judgement (i.e., they were likely not overconfident).  
Because of the relation between confidence and knowledge, a two-way ANOVA was 
conducted comparing the effects of switching from/staying with the default7 and information 
condition on confidence. Results revealed a significant main effect of switching from/staying 
with the default on confidence (F (1,138) = 3.91, p = .05, 𝜂2 = .03 (90% CI [0, 0.09])), such that 
confidence among those switching from the default (M = 2.87, SD = .88) was greater than it was 
among those who stayed with the default (M = 2.58, SD = .83). The information condition also 
had a significant main effect (F (1,138) = 3.78, p = .05, 𝜂2 = .03 (90% CI [0, 0.08])), with those 
 
7 For the confidence variable, I used switch/stay as opposed to in/out in effort to explore an area 
of potential ethical concern. Specifically, I was interested in looking at potential disparities 
between active decision makers (i.e., individuals who, by switching, demonstrated they almost 
certainly must have processed the scenario) and passive decision makers (i.e., decision makers 
who might have passively gone with the default without truly processing the decision scenario).  
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in the relevant information condition reporting higher confidence (M = 2.81, SD = .88) than 
those in the irrelevant information condition (M = 2.58, SD = .84). However, these effects were 
qualified by a significant interaction (F (1,138) = 4.24, p = .04, 𝜂2 = .03 (90% CI [0, 0.09])), 
such that those who stayed with the default reported almost equivalent confidence regardless of 
their information condition (relevant: M = 2.57, SD = .89; irrelevant: M = 2.58, SD = .79; F (1, 
138) = .01, p = .93), while those who switched from the default had higher confidence in the 
relevant information condition (M = 3.14, SD = .75) than did those in the irrelevant condition (M 
= 2.57, SD = .93; F (1, 138) = 6.78, p = .01; see Figure 6). These results provide some support 
for my sixth hypothesis that informed decision makers would be more confident in their choice 
than nudged decision makers. 
 In sum, Experiment 2 replicated the results of the prior experiment. Libertarian 
paternalistic defaults influenced choices to accept recycled water. While the effect of defaults 
observed in this experiment was not as large as that observed in Experiment 1, these results still 
provide additional evidence that libertarian paternalistic default nudges may be effective tools to 
encourage acceptance of potable recycled water. The simple infographic did not reliably 
influence the choice to accept recycled water in this experiment; however, the relationship 
between objective knowledge and choosing to enroll in the program was significant (r(142) = 
.21, p = .01), suggesting that the lack of a reliable effect may be because the simple infographic 
did not increase objective knowledge of recycled water. Finally, the infographic did increase 
confidence for those who decided to switch from the default relative to those who did not receive 
the infographic, suggesting potential ethical costs in selection of the interventions (see general 





 Experiments 1 and 2 provided novel, converging evidence that libertarian paternalistic 
default nudges may encourage acceptance of potable recycled water, but Experiment 2 suggested 
that using defaults to increase recycled water acceptance may come at a cost in terms of 
confidence in choices.  
Experiment 3 was designed to further explore potential impacts in terms of confidence 
and knowledge between nudged and informed choices. Experiment 3 also explored one potential 
reason why the educational intervention in Experiment 2 did not have a main effect on decisions 
to enroll in the recycled water program: the infographic in Experiment 2 was a relatively weak 
intervention. Price and colleagues (2015) found that support for general potable reuse schemes 
increased only when participants received “complex information containing more detailed 
justification of the positive aspects of recycled water” (p. 2180). The infographic used in 
Experiment 2 contained only general arguments supporting potable recycled water, rather than 
detailed justifications, which could explain its relative ineffectiveness. Likewise, it would be 
easy for participants to skip over the infographic, not read it carefully, or not fully internalize the 
limited information that was presented in the infographic. For these reasons, a stronger 
information manipulation was used in Experiment 3 in the form of an educational video about 
recycled potable water in a controlled, lab-based experiment.  
Method 
 Participants. Participants for this experiment were recruited from the undergraduate 
participants pool at the University of Oklahoma. These participants were selected partially 
because I predicted they were more likely to sit through a longer video than Mturk participants. 
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Participants responded to a Qualtrics hosted survey in exchange for partial research participation 
credit. Responses were collected from 165 participants, but a total of 19 participants were 
excluded for answering attention check questions incorrectly, displaying additional signs of 
inattention (e.g., excessive attempts to advance timed survey pages before the option was 
available), and failing to meet the minimum age requirement. Of the remaining 146 participants, 
60% were female (N = 87). The mean age was 19.57 (SD = 3.53), with a range of 18-60 (see 
Table 3 for descriptive statistics from Experiment 3). A post-hoc power analysis indicated that 
the current study could reliably detect a small sized effect (power = .8, alpha = .05 V = 0.23). 
 Procedure. All materials and procedures for this experiment were identical to those 
described in Experiment 2, except the infographics were replaced with short videos. Previous 
research has suggested that videos can be effective at conveying information, engaging 
participants, increasing domain-specific knowledge, and encouraging behavioral change (e.g., 
Acierno et al., 2004; Curbow et al., 2004; Eaden et al., 2002; Geller et al., 2010; Occa & Suggs, 
2016; O’Donnell et al., 1995). Thus, participants in Experiment 3 watched a short video 
providing detailed information about potable reuse water. In the relevant information condition, 
participants watched a short (less than five minutes), publicly available video that explained such 
concepts as direct and indirect potable reuse, the advanced treatment of wastewater in order to 
make it safe for drinking, and the costs and benefits of using these methods 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VZt431qUZQ&t=146s). Meanwhile, those in the 
irrelevant information condition watched a video edited to be of equal length describing how the 





Results and Discussion 
 Inconsistent with the previous two experiments and my first hypothesis, the respective 
defaults were not significantly predictive of reuse water choice, 𝜒2(1) = 0.15, p = .70, V = .03 
(90% CI [0, 0.05]). Specifically, 46 out of 74 participants (62%) in the default-out condition 
chose to enroll in the program, while 47 out of 72 participants (65%) in the default-in condition 
chose to enroll. 
 Consistent with my second and third hypotheses, information condition significantly 
influenced water choice, 𝜒2(1) = 4.60, p = .03, V = .18 (90% CI [0.04, 0.31]), such that 39 out of 
71 participants (55%) in the irrelevant information condition chose to enroll in the water reuse 
program while 54 out of 75 participants (72%) in the relevant information condition chose to 
enroll. Additionally, consistent with my fourth hypothesis, the number of correctly answered 
knowledge questions significantly differed between information condition groups, such that the 
participants in relevant information conditions answered more questions correctly (M = 3.48, SD 
= 1.1) than did those in irrelevant information conditions (M = 2.21, SD = 1.4; t (144) = 5.05, p < 
.001, d = 1.02 (90% CI [.72, 1.30])), while there was no reliable difference in knowledge 
between the default-in and default-out conditions (t (144) = .58, p = .57, d = .10 (90% CI [-.37, 
.18])). A logistic regression revealed the relevant information intervention to be a significant a 
significant predictor of enrollment choice (β = .37, p = .03), and a simple linear regression 
suggested the relevant information was also a significant predictor of objective knowledge (β = 
.46, p < .001). As a result, I then conducted a mediation analysis (with bias-corrected percentile 
bootstrap confidence intervals with 1,000 replications) using objective knowledge as a mediator 
between the relevant educational intervention and enrollment in the program. The average causal 
mediation effect (ACME) was significant (ACME = .11 (90% CI [.04, .20], p = .01) while the 
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average direct effect (ADE) was insignificant (ADE = .06, 90% CI [-.08, .20], p = .49; see Figure 
7 for the full path model). Consistent with Hypothesis 5, this suggests that the effect of the 
educational video on enrollment in the program was fully mediated by objective knowledge.  
 Confidence characteristics were fairly consistent with those observed in Experiment 2. 
Responses to the three confidence questions were averaged into one composite score 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .87). Confidence ratings were significantly correlated with scores on the 
objective knowledge test (r = .24, p < .01; see Table 2 for correlations among variables in 
Experiment 3). Splitting the sample by median knowledge score (high score > 3) again illustrated 
that high knowledge participants (N = 51) were more confident (M = 2.65, SD = 0.77) than low 
knowledge participants (M = 2.19, SD = 0.86; t(144) = 3.16, p < .01, d = .55 (90% CI [0.26, 
0.84])) suggesting adequate confidence calibration. Likewise, a two-way ANOVA comparing the 
effects of switching from/staying with the default and information condition on confidence 
yielded a main effect of information condition on confidence (F (1,142) = 7.45, p < .01, 𝜂2 = .05 
(90% CI [0.01, 0.12])), such that confidence among those in the relevant information conditions 
(M = 2.53, SD = .83) was greater than it was among those who stayed with the default (M = 2.16, 
SD = .84). There was no effect of switching from/staying with the default on confidence (F 
(1,142) = 0.002, p = .97, 𝜂2 < .001); however, these results were again qualified by a significant 
interaction (F (1,142) = 5.47, p = .02, 𝜂2 = .04 (90% CI [0, 0.10])) in which those who stayed 
with their default reported almost equivalent levels of confidence regardless of information 
condition (relevant: M = 2.37, SD = .81; irrelevant: M = 2.32, SD = .84; F (1, 142) = .08, p = 
.78), while those who switched from the default had higher confidence in the relevant 
information condition (M = 2.68, SD = .83) than did those in the irrelevant information condition 
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(M = 1.99, SD = .82; F (1, 142) = 12.47, p < .01; see Figure 8). These results again provide 
partial support for Hypothesis 6. 
 In sum, contrary to results from Experiment 2, libertarian paternalistic default nudges had 
little effect on recycled water acceptance, but the relevant educational intervention did. One 
potential explanation for this discrepancy may be the complexity and depth of the information 
provided in this experiment. The relevant infographic in Experiment 2 was simple and general, 
while the relevant video in this experiment contained more relevant information, which likely 
increased objective knowledge and may have diminished the need to rely on the default. 
Confidence results were similar to those obtained in Experiment 2, suggesting similar ethical 
costs (see discussion).  
Experiment 4 
While Experiment 3 provided evidence that strong educational interventions can also be 
effective at increasing recycled water acceptance, there were several limitations to this study that 
warranted further address. For example, Experiment 3 (and all previous experiments) used binary 
choice about enrolling in the program as the sole indicator of acceptance without taking into 
consideration strength of acceptance. Likewise, while relative effectiveness and confidence are 
good starting points for evaluating differences between educational interventions and libertarian 
paternalistic default nudges, none of the previous experiments examined deeper indicators of 
acceptance (e.g., relevant intentions, behaviors, and emotions). As such Experiment 4 was 






 Participants. Participants for Experiment 4 were recruited using the student participant 
pool at the University of Oklahoma. Responses were collected from a total of 409 participants; 
however, a total of 78 participants were excluded from analyses for failing to complete the 
survey, not meeting the minimum age requirement, and answering comprehension questions 
incorrectly. This resulted in a final sample of 332 participants. Of these remaining participants, 
participants ranged in age from 18 to 44 (M = 19.5, SD = 2.38). 56% identified as female (N = 
186), with 145 males and one participant who did not disclose their gender (see Table 4 for 
descriptive statistics from Experiment 4). A post-hoc power analysis indicated that the current 
study could reliably detect a small sized effect (power = .8, alpha = .05 V = 0.15). 
 Procedure. Participants for Experiment 4 first completed a pretest gauging objective 
knowledge of recycled water. Because the knowledge measure used in Experiments 2 and 3 was 
not validated prior to use in those experiments, for this experiment I used a set of 39 true/false/I 
don’t know items validated by Mahmoud-Elhaj et al. (2020). Correct responses to each question 
were coded as 1, while incorrect or “I don’t know” responses were coded as 0. These were then 
summed to form a composite pre-knowledge score. Next, participants were randomly assigned to 
a relevant or irrelevant educational information condition. Materials for the irrelevant condition 
were identical to those used in Experiment 3. In the relevant information condition, participants 
watched a new five-minute educational video developed in conjunction with recycled water 
experts (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eGcZjnwQy2w). This new video was used because 
I hypothesized its content would be more relevant to the participants (Experiment 3 used a video 
with contents specific to Australia, which covered a wide variety of recycled water topics, while 
this video was specific to the United States and only covered topics deemed important by water 
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experts). Specifically, this video emphasized the need for recycled water to (e.g., to sustain 
population growth and resist problems caused by drought), explanations of direct, indirect, and 
de-facto reuse (i.e., the notion that much drinking water is already recycled because it often 
contains treated wastewater discharged from upstream communities; see Rice et al., 2013), 
information concerning the wastewater treatment process, and testimonials and information 
concerning sites in the United States already using recycled water. 
 Participants were then randomly assigned and responded to one of the default choice 
conditions used in all previous experiments. They also responded to a set of four confidence 
questions similar to those used previously, drawn from Scherer et al. (2015): 
 1) I feel satisfied with my decision. 
 2) I feel confident in my decision. 
 3) The decision that I made was the best possible for me personally. 
 4) I have no reservations about my decision. 
These items were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) 
and displayed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .84), thus responses were averaged 
to form a composite confidence score.   
 Next, participants responded to the objective knowledge of recycled water scale again to 
obtain a post-knowledge score. Scores on this test were also subtracted from scores on the pre-
knowledge test to gauge the amount of recycled water knowledge gained after the education and 
default interventions. Subsequently, participants responded to a set of questions aimed at gauging 
deeper acceptance as illustrated by the strength of their recycled water acceptance. This consisted 
of six questions: 
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1) How likely are you to drink recycled water? (11-point Juster scale; 1 = almost no 
chance/1 chance in 100, 11 = practically certain/99 chances in 100) 
2) Would you support or oppose using recycled water at your residence? (7-point Likert 
scale; 1 = strongly oppose, 7 = strongly support)  
3) I do not want purified recycled water to be mixed with drinking water. (7-point Likert 
scale; 1 =strongly agree, 7 = strongly disagree) 
4) I would be willing to add my name to a mailing list to receive information about 
recycled water. (7-point Likert scale; 1 =strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
5) I would be willing to donate money to an organization advocating for the use of 
recycled water. (7-point Likert scale; 1 =strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
6) I would be willing to attend a townhall meeting discussing the possibility of using 
recycled water in my community. (7-point Likert scale; 1 =strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree) 
Items 1-3 were drawn from previous literature (Garcia-Cuerva et al., 2016; Kemp et al., 2012; 
Nancarrow et al., 2009) and were thought to represent “direct acceptance” of recycled water (i.e., 
items related specifically to supporting/drinking recycled water). Items 4-6 were newly 
developed for this project and were thought to represent “indirect acceptance” of recycled water 
(i.e., items not directly related to drinking/accepting recycled water, but nonetheless would likely 
indicate a high level of support for recycled water). Because Item 1 was measured on a different 
scale than the other items, I checked skew and kurtosis statistics and ensured none of the items 
were significantly non-normally distributed (skewness range: [-.48, .16], kurtosis range: [-1.31, -
.13]) and then standardized scores by calculating z-scores for each item. Then, to verify the 
hypothesized structure (i.e., items 1-3 loading onto one “direct acceptance” factor and items 4-6 
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loading onto an “indirect acceptance” factor), I conducted a confirmatory factor analysis which 
found that this model fit the data well (χ2 (8) = 9.42, p = .31; RMSEA = .02, 90% CI [.00, .07]; 
CFI = 1.0; TLI = 1.0, SRMR = .02; see Figure 9 for parameter estimates). Thus, z-scores for 
items 1-3 were summed to form a score for direct acceptance, and z-scores for items 4-6 were 
summed to form an indirect acceptance score. 
 Next, participants completed several items related to other deeper acceptance criteria that 
should be taken into consideration when comparing libertarian paternalistic default nudges and 
educational interventions. Specifically, I was interested in gauging the extent to which 
participants felt they would be satisfied with policymakers, their relevant affective reactions 
(worry), the extent to which they would endorse engaging in specific actions in protest to 
recycled water, and the extent to which they would recommend specific courses of action for 
others if recycled water were to be implemented in their city. To measure satisfaction with 
policymakers, I asked two questions: 
1) I would be upset with my local government if they asked people to use recycled water 
for drinking. (Reverse coded) 
2) I would trust my local government if they decided to ask people to use recycled water 
for drinking. 
To measure affective reactions, I asked one question: 
I would be worried about my health if my local government decided to ask people to use 
recycled water for drinking. 
To measure endorsement of specific courses of action, I asked two questions: 
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1) I would likely protest if my local government decided to ask people to use recycled 
water for drinking. 
2) I would consider moving if my local government decided to ask people to use 
recycled water for drinking. 
Finally, to measure recommendations of action for others, I asked one question: 
I would tell my friends and family not to move here if my local government decided to 
ask people to use recycled water for drinking. 
Each item was measured on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). 
For the measures with two items, item responses were highly correlated (satisfaction: r = .54, p < 
.001; intentions: r = .70, p < .001; see Table 5 for correlations from Experiment 4), so those 
scores were summed to form composite satisfaction and intention scores, respectively. 
 Next, in order to incorporate some demonstratable behavioral measures of recycled water 
acceptance, participants were informed that the researchers were interested in estimating the 
number of students at the University of Oklahoma (OU) that would be supportive of investing in 
recycled water technologies and were asked if they would be willing to do three things to 
indicate their support: 
1) "Like" OU WaTER Center (OU's center for research about water technologies) on 
Facebook? 
2) Sign up for OU WaTER Center's newsletter? 
3) Complete 10 math problems in exchange for the researchers making a $.10 donation 
to water.org (a global nonprofit organization that works to provide access to safe 
water in many countries around the world)? 
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Participants could answer “yes” or “no” to each of these actions and were informed that by 
answering “yes,” they would be redirected to the appropriate websites at the end of the survey. 
 Participants then completed several sections of survey unrelated to this experiment, all 
the covariate and demographic measures from previous experiments, and a popular demographic 
question gauging political affiliation (see Kivikangas et al., 2021): 
Here is a seven-point scale on which political views people might hold are arranged from 
extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this 
scale? (7-point Likert scale; 1 = extremely liberal, 4 = moderate, 7 = extremely 
conservative) 
Finally, participants were asked to complete any of the behavioral measures to which they had 
previously committed8. 
Results and Discussion 
 Shallow acceptance. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, in this experiment, defaults were 
significantly associated with the binary choice to enroll in the hypothetical water recycling 
program, 𝜒2(1) = 19.65, p < .001, V = .24 (90% CI [.15, .33]). Specifically, 128 out of 163 (79%) 
participants in the default-in condition chose to enroll in the program while 94 out of 169 (56%) 
participants in the default-out condition chose to enroll. Meanwhile, consistent with Hypothesis 2 
(but inconsistent with Hypothesis 3), the educational intervention was marginally associated with 
 
8 Neither defaults (r = -.02, p = .75) nor educational interventions (r = .04, p = .45) were 
associated with committing to the behavioral measures, thus it was not included in further 
analyses. Note, however, that each of the behavioral measures were similar to the items in the 
indirect acceptance measure, thus in future research, it is possible that behavioral measures 
related to direct acceptance might yield different results. For example, since the educational 
video was associated with direct acceptance in this experiment, it might be associated with more 
willingness to actually drink a bottle of recycled water.  
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enrollment in the program, 𝜒2(1) = 2.93, p = .09, V = .09 (90% CI [.00, .18]), with 117 out of 164 
(71%) participants in the relevant information condition choosing to enroll compared to 105 out 
of 168 (63%) in the irrelevant information condition. Notably, however, this marginally 
significant effect was likely due to high amount participants in the irrelevant information 
condition choosing to enroll. Participants in the relevant info condition enrolled at almost the 
same rate as those in the default-in condition, thus it is possible that these results might suggest 
an overall high willingness for participants in this sample to enroll in the program. Accordingly, 
these results may be indicative of the power of default-out condition (i.e., the default-out 
condition may have been effective at influencing people to opt out of the program, while the 
irrelevant educational intervention was comparatively less effective). I also conducted a logistic 
regression to check for any interaction between defaults and the educational interventions. 
Defaults significantly predicted enrollment (β = .54, p = .01) and the educational intervention 
also had a marginally significant effect (β = -.21, p = .06), but there was no reliably significant 
interaction effect (β = -.17, p = .18) 
 Deeper acceptance: acceptance strength. I next used a 2x2 ANOVA to compare the 
effects of the defaults and educational interventions on strength of recycled water acceptance 
(see Table 2 for correlations from Experiment 4). Consistent with Hypothesis 7, for direct 
acceptance, there was a significant main effect of educational intervention (F (1, 328) = 9.66, p < 
.01, 𝜂2 = .03 (90% CI [0.01, 0.06])), with the relevant information resulting in higher direct 
acceptance (M = .46, SD = 2.73) than the irrelevant information (M = -.45, SD = 2.46). There 
was no reliable effect of default (F (1, 328) = 2.53, p = .11, 𝜂2 = .01 (90% CI [0.00, 0.03])) and 
no reliable interaction between the educational interventions and defaults (F (1, 328) = .48, p = 
.49, 𝜂2 = .001 (90% CI [0.00, 0.02])) for direct acceptance (see Figure 10). Meanwhile, for 
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indirect acceptance, neither defaults (F (1, 328) = .22, p = .64, 𝜂2 < .001 (90% CI [0.00, 0.01])) 
nor educational interventions (F (1, 328) = .41, p = .52, 𝜂2 = .001 (90% CI [0.00, 0.02])) had 
reliable main effects, and there was no reliable interaction either (F (1, 328) = .35, p = .55, 𝜂2 = 
.001 (90% CI [0.00, 0.01]); see Figure 11). 
 Knowledge gain. To examine whether knowledge gain could be the mechanism through 
which the relevant educational intervention influenced recycled water acceptance when using the 
strength measure, I next looked at knowledge characteristics between the two educational 
intervention conditions. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, objective knowledge gain (using pre/post-
intervention difference scores) differed significantly between the irrelevant and relevant 
education conditions (t (330) = 9.13, p < .001, d = 1.00 (90% CI [.81, 1.19])) with those in the 
relevant condition gaining more knowledge (M = 8.42, SD = 7.98) than those in the irrelevant 
condition (M = 1.21, SD = 6.32), while objective knowledge gain did not reliably differ between 
those in the default-in and default-out conditions (t (330) = .10, p = .92, d = .01 (90% CI [-.19, 
.17])). Simple linear regressions revealed the relevant information intervention to be a significant 
predictor of both direct acceptance (β = .17, p < .01) and objective knowledge gained (β = .45, p 
< .001). As a result, I then conducted mediation analyses (with bias-corrected percentile 
bootstrap confidence intervals with 1,000 replications and generalized least squares (GLS) 
estimators) using knowledge gain as a mediator between the relevant educational intervention 
and acceptance. The standardized average causal mediation effect was significant (ACME = .08 
(90% CI [.04, .14], p < .01) while the average direct effect (ADE) was insignificant (ADE = .09, 
90% CI [-.01, .20], p = .12; see Figure 12 for the full path model). Consistent with Hypothesis 5, 
this suggests that the effect of the educational video on direct acceptance was fully mediated by 
objective knowledge gained. Meanwhile, the relevant educational intervention was not a 
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significant predictor of indirect acceptance (β = .03, p = .54), meaning the statistical conditions 
for mediation were not present for that outcome. 
 Confidence. Next, I compared defaults and educational interventions on decision 
confidence. Similar to previous experiments, post-objective knowledge was significantly 
correlated with confidence (r = .13, p = .02), so I used a rough median split to group participants 
into low (N = 163) and high (N = 169) post-objective knowledge groups (high score > 26). An 
independent samples t-test revealed that high knowledge participants were more confident in 
their decision (M = 3.93, SD = .74) than low knowledge participants (M = 3.72, SD = .77; t (330) 
= 2.53, p = .01, d = .28, 90% CI [.10, .46]), suggesting at least some people’s confidence was 
calibrated. Thus, I conducted a 2x2 ANOVA comparing the effects of switching from/staying 
with the default and information condition on confidence. Results largely replicated patterns 
observed in Experiments 2 and 3. Specifically, there was no reliable effect of switching from the 
default on confidence (F (1, 328) = 1.20, p = .28, 𝜂2 < .01 (90% CI [0.00, 0.02])) and there was a 
main effect of educational intervention on confidence (F (1, 328) = 8.78, p < .01, 𝜂2 = .03 (90% 
CI [0.01, 0.06])) where those in the relevant information condition were more confident (M = 
3.93, SD = .77) than those who watched the control video (M = 3.72, SD = .74). However, the 
interaction between the two conditions was also marginally significant (F (1, 328) = 3.37, p = 
.07, 𝜂2 = .01 (90% CI [0.00, 0.04])), such that those who stayed with their defaults maintained 
similar levels of confidence regardless of their educational intervention (irrelevant: M = 3.81, SD 
= .73, relevant: M = 3.90, SD = .81; F (1, 328) = .82, p = .37), while those who switched were 
significantly less confident in the irrelevant condition (M = 3.56, SD = .74) than those who were 
in the relevant condition (M = 3.97, SD = .73; F (1, 328) = 9.40, p < .01; see Figure 13). 
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Deeper acceptance: other indicators. To assess satisfaction with policymakers, a 2x2 
ANOVA between default condition and educational intervention condition yielded no reliable 
effect of default (F (1, 328) = 2.74, p = .10, 𝜂2 = .01 (90% CI [0.00, 0.04])), but a significant 
main effect of educational intervention (F (1, 328) = 5.29, p = .02, 𝜂2 = .02 (90% CI [0.00, 
0.05])), such that those in the irrelevant information condition felt they would be less satisfied 
with policymakers (M = 9.40, SD = 2.47) than those in the relevant information condition (M = 
10.05, SD = 2.50). There was no reliable interaction between defaults and educational 
interventions (F (1, 328) = .87, p = .35, 𝜂2 < .01 (90% CI [0.00, 0.02])) for satisfaction with 
policymakers (see Figure 14). For affective reactions (i.e., worry), there was no reliable effect of 
default (F (1, 328) = .91, p = .34, 𝜂2 < .01 (90% CI [0.00, 0.02])), but a significant main effect of 
educational intervention (F (1, 328) = 8.40, p < .01, 𝜂2 = .03 (90% CI [0.00, 0.06])), such that 
those in the irrelevant information condition felt they would be more worried about their health 
(M = 3.76, SD = 1.45) than those in the relevant information condition (M = 3.28, SD = 1.53). 
There was also no reliable interaction between defaults and educational interventions (F (1, 328) 
= .02, p = .88, 𝜂2 < .001 (90% CI [0.00, 0.01])) on this variable (see Figure 15).  
For the intentions variable (i.e., protesting and considering moving), there were 
significant main effects of both defaults (F (1, 328) = 4.66, p = .03, 𝜂2 = .01 (90% CI [0.00, 
0.04])) and educational interventions (F (1, 328) = 6.45, p = .01, 𝜂2 = .02 (90% CI [0.00, 0.05])), 
such that those who were defaulted in reported being more inclined to protest and move (M = 
5.29, SD = 2.62) than those who were defaulted out (M = 4.70, SD = 2.10), and those in the 
irrelevant information condition were more willing to protest/move (M = 5.33, SD = 2.30) than 
those in the relevant education condition (M = 4.65, SD = 2.42). There was no reliable 
interaction between the two (F (1, 328) = .11, p = .74, 𝜂2 < .001 (90% CI [0.00, 0.01]); see 
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Figure 16). Finally, for the recommendations variable, there was a marginally significant main 
effect of defaults (F (1, 328) = 3.13, p = .08, 𝜂2 = .01 (90% CI [0.00, 0.03])) and a significant 
effect of educational interventions (F (1, 328) = 9.09, p < .01, 𝜂2 = .03 (90% CI [0.01, 0.06])), 
such that those who were defaulted in reported being slightly more inclined to recommend that 
their family stay away (M = 2.85, SD = 1.55) than those who were defaulted out (M = 2.56, S.E. 
= 1.33), and those in the irrelevant information condition were more likely to make that same 
recommendation (M = 2.94, SD = 1.43) than those in the relevant information condition (M = 
2.46, SD = 1.42). Likewise, there was no reliable interaction between the two (F (1, 328) = .01, p 
= .94, 𝜂2 < .001 (90% CI [0.00, 0.01]); see Figure 17). In sum, these deep acceptance results 
were all consistent with my seventh hypothesis that educational decision aids would be more 
effective at increasing deep acceptance than libertarian paternalistic default nudges. 
Integrated decision model. Finally, using Cokely et al's. (2018) model of skilled 
decision making (see Figure 1) as a guide, I constructed several structural models to illustrate the 
potential decision pathways. For the first two models, I integrated the educational video, 
numeracy, post-objective knowledge, worry, and the deeper acceptance outcomes (one model 
tested direct acceptance and the second tested indirect acceptance; see Figures 18 and 19, 
respectively). For the final model, I used the shallow binary enrollment choice indicator, and I 
also integrated defaults (see Figure 20). In all instances, the data fit the hypothesized model well 
(direct: χ2 (3) = 3.55, p = .31; RMSEA = .02, 90% CI [.00, .10]; CFI = 1.0; TLI = 1.0, SRMR = 
.02; indirect: χ2 (3) = 4.63, p = .20; RMSEA = .04, 90% CI [.00, .11]; CFI = .99; TLI = .96, 
SRMR = .02; binary enrollment: χ2 (5) = 8.71, p = .12; RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.00, .10]; CFI = 
.97; TLI = .94). Across all models, worry was consistently the strongest predictor of acceptance 
(direct: β = .-58, p < .001; indirect: β = .-20, p < .001; binary enrollment: β = -.39, p < .001). For 
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the deeper acceptance models, objective knowledge was also a good direct predictor of 
acceptance (direct: β = .26, p < .001; indirect: β = .16, p < .01), but this was not true for the 
binary enrollment model (β = .12, p = .10). Meanwhile, in the binary enrollment model, defaults 
were a strong predictor of shallow acceptance (β = .32, p < .001). Finally, across all models, both 
numeracy (deep acceptance models: β = .14, p < .01, binary choice model: β = .15, p < .01) and 
the relevant educational video (deep acceptance models: β = .35, p < .001, binary choice model: 
β = .39, p < .001) directly predicted objective knowledge, and numeracy also directly predicted 
worry (β = -.19, p < .001), while objective knowledge was also a significant predictor of worry 
(deep acceptance models: β = -.24, p < .001, binary choice model: β = -.25, p < .001). 
Discussion. Results from this experiment replicated many of the relationships observed 
in prior experiments, but also revealed new relationships that had previously not been explored. 
In terms of binary enrollment choice, replicating Experiments 1 and 2, defaulting participants 
into the program was significantly associated with shallow acceptance of recycled water (i.e., 
choice to enroll in the program). Meanwhile, similar to Experiment 3, the relevant educational 
intervention also mildly influenced the choice to enroll; however, in this experiment, it was not 
as effective as the default. This might suggest that even in the presence of a strong educational 
intervention, libertarian paternalistic defaults can still be a highly effective way to influence 
shallow acceptance choices. Likewise, this experiment replicated confidence results from 
Experiments 2 and 3, as those who stayed with respective default options displayed similar levels 
of confidence regardless of the information they were given, but those who switched without 
being exposed to the educational intervention were significantly less confident in their choice 
than those who did receive the relevant educational intervention. 
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This experiment also added to the previous experiments by comparing the different types 
of interventions on strength of acceptance. The relevant educational intervention was effective at 
increasing the strength of direct acceptance of recycled water (which was mediated by objective 
knowledge gained), while defaulting participants into the program was not effective at increasing 
acceptance strength. Neither intervention was effective at increasing indirect acceptance, but this 
might be attributable to the fact that the indirect acceptance measure involved endorsing actions 
that were more involved (i.e., attending town hall meetings, donating money, and signing up for 
information) than those involved in direct acceptance. Frequency distributions for individual 
acceptance items provide some evidence for this, as the indirect acceptance questions were 
generally positively skewed (see Figure 21), while the direct acceptance questions were 
generally negatively skewed (see Figure 22).  
Finally, this experiment also evaluated libertarian paternalistic defaults and educational 
interventions regarding additional, deeper acceptance criteria (e.g., satisfaction with 
policymakers, intentions, affect, and recommended course of action). For each of these variables 
the relevant educational intervention was effective at increasing desirable outcomes (e.g., 
satisfaction with policymakers) and decreasing undesirable outcomes (e.g., negative affect, 
intentions to protest/move) relative to the educational control, while defaulting people in either 
had no effect (e.g., on satisfaction and negative affect), or increased the undesirable outcome 
(e.g., intentions of moving/protesting and advising others to stay away) relative to defaulting 
people out.       
General Discussion 
Overall, results from these four experiments suggest that both libertarian paternalistic 
defaults and appropriate educational interventions may be effective at increasing recycled water 
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acceptance for some people and under the right circumstances. Given the consistency with which 
the libertarian paternalistic default nudges were successful influencing some people to enroll in 
the hypothetical reuse programs in Experiments 1, 2, and 4, it might be reasonable to conclude 
that defaults could be used to help some individuals come to accept recycled water. However, 
Experiment 4 also suggested that libertarian paternalistic defaults may only influence surface-
level acceptance, as defaulting people into the recycled water program had no effect (and 
sometimes negative effects, compared to defaulting people out of the program) on acceptance 
strength and deeper indicators of acceptance, such as affect, satisfaction with policymakers, and 
reported behavioral intentions. Meanwhile, simple information conveyed using infographics did 
not influence recycled water acceptance in Experiment 2, but more detailed, complex 
information conveyed using videos increased acceptance in Experiments 3 and 4. Likewise, 
stronger information had positive impacts on acceptance strength and the deeper indicators of 
acceptance, suggesting that the right kind of information conveyed in the right setting might also 
increase recycled water acceptance for some (see Table 6 for a simplified summary of results).  
Theoretically, these results are largely consistent with what would be predicted by the 
framework for skilled decision making (Cokely et al., 2018). As was discussed previously, part 
of skilled decision theory posits that transparent decision aids (i.e., aids that are specifically 
designed to promote understanding) and general cognitive abilities (e.g., numeracy) support 
skilled decision making by directly influencing deliberation, confidence calibration, and 
knowledge, which in turn affects the precision and calibration of affective reactions (see Figure 
1). Structural models from Experiment 4 supported this theoretical framework, as the educational 
video and numeracy both were associated with increased knowledge, which typically had modest 
direct effects on acceptance outcomes (e.g., acceptance strength, enrollment choice). However, 
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in each case, knowledge seemed to have a stronger indirect effect on acceptance, specifically 
through affect (i.e., knowledge decreased worries about health, which in turn had a strong impact 
on acceptance). These results seem consistent with result from Cokely and Kelley (2009), who 
found that evaluations between feelings, thoughts, and consequences fully mediated relations 
between cognitive ability and decision making performance. Overall, these results suggest that 
the effective educational decision aids likely influenced both shallow and deep acceptance 
decisions by increasing representative understanding (i.e., they increased comprehension of 
relevant information, which in turn might have helped individuals better understand implications 
for their own life, leading to appropriate affective reactions and decisions/intentions consistent 
with expert consensus concerning recycled water). Meanwhile, the ineffective infographic in 
Experiment 2 did not increase knowledge, and thus might not have been strong enough to prompt 
representative understanding. Future studies might wish to explore the skilled decision 
framework more fully (e.g., by collecting and integrating deliberation data). 
Meanwhile, the structural model for binary enrollment choice in Experiment 4 supported 
the idea that libertarian paternalistic default nudges might have had a direct effect on shallow 
acceptance. Libertarian paternalistic defaults were never associated with increased knowledge 
and were often only effective at influencing choice when the educational intervention was not 
effective. Thus, these results seemed largely consistent with the widely accepted notion that 
nudges affect decisions by influencing automatic processing (i.e., quick, reflexive thinking as 
opposed to more effortful, reflective processes; Hansen & Jespersen, 2013; Hausman & Welch, 
2010; Johnson et al., 2012; Selinger & Whyte, 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). This might 
suggest that libertarian paternalistic defaults largely bypassed rational agency. However, future 
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research may wish to verify these assumptions (e.g., by using reaction time data or process 
tracing methods).   
 Practically, these results imply that multiple factors often need to be taken into account 
when deciding which type of intervention will be better suited for specific needs and individuals. 
For example, future researchers and policy makers contemplating educational-based approaches 
should carefully consider the types of information they will use (i.e., none vs. simple vs. 
complex) and the mediums through which they will communicate information (e.g., static 
infographic vs. video), as both of these factors may play a role—and perhaps interact—in 
determining the effectiveness of the chosen intervention. Likewise, the type of acceptance (i.e., 
shallow vs. deep) should also be considered, as it seems libertarian paternalistic defaults may be 
effective in some regards (e.g., at increasing overall choices), but educational interventions may 
be effective in other regards (e.g., at increasing willingness to endorse specific actions related to 
direct acceptance, as well as increasing desirable downstream effects on affect, confidence, etc.). 
Apart from practical implementation of these policies, this series of studies also 
highlights some important ethical evaluative dimensions for choice architecture. Results across 
these four experiments suggested several ethical costs that could be associated with selecting 
libertarian paternalistic default nudges over educational interventions. The first ethical cost 
involves the likely bypassing of rational agency and its potential cost to autonomy. As was 
demonstrated in both Experiments 3 and 4, knowledge mediated the relationship between 
successful educational interventions and acceptance but did not mediate the relationship between 
libertarian paternalistic defaults and acceptance.  Given that autonomy involves the ability to 
make self-determined, informed decisions in accordance with one’s own values (Buchanan et al., 
1989; Dworkin, 1981; Mele, 2001), these results show that to the extent the libertarian 
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paternalistic defaults did not provide relevant information, they likely infringed upon (or at least 
did not promote) an individual’s ability to truly make an informed decision in some cases. 
Because informed deliberation is thought to be an important component for autonomy, to my 
knowledge, this is the first empirical demonstration that libertarian paternalistic defaults might 
come at an observable cost to autonomy (i.e., by making individuals less informed decision 
makers).  
This potential cost in terms of autonomy is concerning, given that autonomy is thought to 
have both instrumental and intrinsic value (i.e., it helps bring about other good things, and it is 
also thought to be valuable in and of itself). For example, past literature has revealed a link 
between autonomy and various indicators of well-being (e.g., positive affect, self-acceptance, 
prosocial behavior, and improved health outcomes; Vedam et al., 2017; Weinstein et al., 2012; 
Wichmann, 2011), and some have even called autonomy a basic psychological need (e.g., Deci 
et al., 2001; Ryan & Deci, 2000; Wichmann, 2011). Likewise, some have suggested that 
autonomy is important simply because there is value in being the author of one’s own life (Benn, 
1975; Dworkin, 1988). Furthermore, it has also been argued that respect for autonomy is one of 
our most widely agreed upon values (Feltz & Cokely, 2021). As such, this is a line of research 
that merits further research. Future work should seek to further explore default and other 
libertarian paternalistic policies’ effects on autonomy (e.g., by using or developing a scale of 
perceived coercion to measure the extent to which one feels different forms of choice 
architecture forced them to choose a specific option).   
In a similar vein, there could also be a concerning ethical cost involved in the fact that 
libertarian paternalistic default nudges influenced shallow acceptance but not deep acceptance. 
Beyond the interesting practical costs that were demonstrated in Experiment 4 (i.e., that on the 
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whole, despite the fact that defaulting people into the program made them more willing to enroll 
in the program, defaulting people in also made people more likely to protest, move, and make 
corresponding recommendations to others), there could also be a concerning ethical cost to using 
an intervention that affects one’s actions but often does not affect their corresponding deeper-self 
(i.e., deeper-held desires, values, beliefs, etc.). Wolf (2013) might refer to this condition (i.e., 
incongruence between shallow actions and the deeper self) as a case where individuals have been 
“alienated from their actions” (p. 376) as their actions then become governed not by their deeper-
selves, but by external and independent forces. According to Mele (2001), this could also have 
implications for autonomy: 
Full‐blown, deliberative, intentional action involves (1) some psychological basis for 
evaluative reasoning (e.g., values, desires, and beliefs); (2) an evaluative judgment that is 
made on the basis of such reasoning and recommends a particular course of action; (3) an 
intention formed or acquired on the basis of that judgment; (4) an action, A, executing 
that intention. An agent who lacks control at any of these junctures does not 
autonomously A. [emphasis added; p. 13] 
To the extent they did not provide relevant information, libertarian paternalistic defaults may not 
have prompted some people to make evaluative judgements based on their values, desires, or 
beliefs. Thus, these results might provide additional evidence that conditions for autonomy may 
not have been fully respected.  
Even if, however, we assume that the shallow action was completely autonomous, one 
would still need to consider which form of self (i.e., shallow or deep) is more important for 
policymakers to respect. Ultimately, to the extent that the deep-self could be considered more 
important (a conjecture with which I hypothesize many people would concur—one could easily 
48 
 
argue that the deep-self is more reflective of who we are as individuals), there would still be an 
ethical cost involved in using the default as opposed to the educational intervention. This could 
be a fruitful topic of future research (e.g., by replicating results from Experiment 4 and by 
examining the extent to which individuals value the shallow vs. the deep self).  
Finally, across all the experiments where it was measured, libertarian paternalistic default 
nudges were consistently related to concerning trends in decision confidence. Specifically, in 
Experiments 2-4, there were consistent interactions between education and defaults on 
confidence where those who switched from their defaults were significantly less confident when 
they had not received relevant information, compared to those who did receive relevant 
information). Given the previously discussed link between knowledge, appropriate confidence, 
and decision quality and the positive associations between knowledge and confidence observed 
in each of these experiments, there a potential cost involved for those who switched from 
defaults without relevant information. That is, to the extent that we can consider those who 
switched active decision makers (because in order to switch from the default, there was arguably 
at least some consideration as to how the choice fit in with their preferences, beliefs, and values), 
it is concerning that these participants seemed unable to achieve the level of confidence they 
could have reached simply because they were denied relevant information. Likewise, these 
results may also point to potential disparities that policymakers and researchers alike may fail to 
take into account when implementing interventions (i.e., group differences that could cause the 
interventions to differ in effectiveness). Future research should seek to take better stock of group 
differences (e.g., decision making tendencies, political ideologies, cognitive abilities, etc.) that 




Even with potential ethical costs, however, persuasion using libertarian paternalistic 
default nudges has benefits that may make them desirable to use in some cases. For example, 
default nudges usually have low implementation costs. It would likely cost significantly less to 
use some libertarian paternalistic strategy than it would to develop effective educational 
materials, run ads on television, print and distribute informational pamphlets, etc. Furthermore, 
libertarian paternalistic default nudges typically deliver more immediate results (Sunstein, 2014), 
thus in more urgent situations (e.g., when a water shortage is imminent or where there are urgent 
public health issues), one might have good reason to use defaults (or even non-libertarian 
paternalistic policies) to persuade. Moreover, in some cases, as was illustrated in these 
experiments, defaults can be more effective than information-based approaches, and even after 
educational materials are distributed, there is no guarantee that individuals will take the time to 
examine or process the information. Likewise, in many cases, it might not be necessary to 
influence deeper acceptance (e.g., in decisions that are rare and usually do not affect one’s day-
to-day life—for example, registering to be an organ donor). For these reasons, I recommend that 
future decisions between nudge-based persuasion and knowledge-based interventions in this 
domain be accompanied by cost-benefit analyses (Hertwig, 2017; Trout, 2005). These analyses 
should take into account factors such as relative effectiveness compared to other alternatives and 
implementation costs but should likewise take into account potential ethical costs (e.g., shallow 
versus deep acceptance, knowledge gain). This need underscores the necessity for future research 
that can better quantify costs to decision specific autonomy (and other related ethical costs) along 
with detailing the relevant dimensions those comparisons could be made on.  
 Of course, these studies have some notable limitations. Perhaps most notable is the 
hypothetical and somewhat unrealistic nature of the scenarios. The hypothetical scenario and 
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accompanying binary enrollment choice might not have been highly representative of an actual 
choice environment or the type of recycled water decision one would typically be expected to 
make (i.e., individuals typically do not choose whether their house specifically will receive 
recycled water), meaning these results might not generalize to a real-world setting. It is possible 
that choosing to enroll in a hypothetical program to receive recycled water from a residential tap 
would predict related actions (e.g., supporting a referendum about recycled water; for example, 
in Experiment 4 there was a strong correlation between the enrollment choice and direct 
acceptance (r = .45, p < .001)). However, future studies should seek to replicate these findings 
using more realistic behavioral outcomes (e.g., by having participants choose between an actual 
bottle of recycled water vs. a normal water bottle they had received by default; see Leong & 
Lebel, 2020). Furthermore, data concerning deep acceptance were only gathered from 
Experiment 4, thus it would be advisable to replicate those results using a general population 
sample. Finally, this research only explored effects in the domain of recycled water. Future 
research should seek to replicate these results in other domains.  
To summarize, this research suggests there are multiple strategies and factors to consider 
when designing effective decision environments aimed at ethically increasing potable recycled 
water acceptance. Many communities across the world are currently debating, planning, or 
implementing potable recycled water programs. In terms of recycled water acceptance, continued 
collaboration between water experts, policy makers, and decision scientists will therefore likely 
be essential to map out the key features that will help, in an ethical way, inform which strategies 
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Figure 3  

















Figure 4  
























Figure 6  





























Figure 7  
GLM Mediation Path Analysis from Study 3 
 





























































Direct Acceptance Results from Experiment 4 with 90% Confidence Intervals 
 



























Indirect Acceptance Results from Experiment 4 with 90% Confidence Intervals 
 


























GLS Mediation Path Analysis for Direct Acceptance of Recycled Water 
 








































































































































































Skilled Decision Path Model for Direct Acceptance 
 
Note.  Path values are standardized, with standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, 













Skilled Decision Path Model for Indirect Acceptance 
 
Note.  Path values are standardized, with standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, 













Skilled Decision Path Model for Binary Enrollment Choice (Shallow Acceptance) 
 
Note.  Path values are standardized, with standard errors in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, 














Frequency Distributions for Direct Acceptance Questions 
 









Descriptive Statistics from Experiment 2 
 Default Condition  Information Condition 
  In (N = 73)  Out (N = 69)  Relevant (N = 70)  Irrelevant (N = 72) 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Age 37.93 (13.46)  39.41 (13.70)  39.71 (14.39)  37.61 (12.69) 
Gender .40 (.49)  .30 (.46)  .36 (.48)  .35 (.48) 
Choice .58 (.50)  .39 (.49)  .50 (.50)  .47 (.50) 
Knowledge 3.26 (1.32)  3.42 (1.33)  3.39 (1.27)  3.29 (1.39) 
Confidence 2.82 (.86)  2.64 (.87)  2.83 (.88)  2.64 (.84) 
Disgust 55.52 (17.45)  56.61 (18.75)  58.06 (18.33)  54.10 (17.65) 
Numeracy 3.0 (2.0)  3.36 (1.59)  3.03 (1.85)  3.31 (1.81) 
Note. N = 142; variables were coded as follows: choice (0 = did not enroll in water program, 1 = 























Note. Variables were coded as follows: acceptance (0 = did not enroll in water program, 1 = enrolled); default (0 = out, 1 = in); info 
condition (0 = irrelevant, 1 = relevant); gender (0 = female, 1 = male; * p <.05, ** p < .01 
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Descriptive Statistics from Experiment 3 
 Default Condition  Information Condition 
  In (N = 72)  Out (N = 74)  Relevant (N = 75)  Irrelevant (N = 71) 
 M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
Age 19.67 (4.89)  19.47 (1.23)  19.23 (1.01)  19.93 (4.95) 
Gender .38 (.49)  .43 (.50)  .47 (.50)  .34 (.48) 
Choice .65 (.48)  .62 (.49)  .72 (.45)  .55 (.50) 
Knowledge 2.93 (1.38)  2.80 (1.42)  3.48 (2.21)  2.21 (1.39) 
Confidence 2.45 (.80)  2.25 (.90)  2.53 (.83)  2.16 (.84) 
Disgust 56.28 (15.83)  57.08 (15.23)  58.79 (14.47)  54.47 (16.29) 
Numeracy 2.96 (1.55)  3.31 (1.37)  3.11 (1.57)  3.17 (1.37) 
Note. N = 146; variables were coded as follows: choice (0 = did not enroll in water program, 1 = 



































Simplified Summary of Reliable Effects for All Experiments 
 
